Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
constituted a major shift in the treatment of expert testimony in
Federal Court cases. Prior to Daubert, courts and commentators
regarded Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) as
the pre-eminent case on the admission of expert testimony. The
Frye standard of "general acceptance" within the scientific
community was modified by the Federal Rules of Evidence (and in
particular, Rule 702) and ultimately Daubert found that Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence (as interpreted in Daubert)
completely displaced the Frye test. This occurred in 1993.
An overview of the "gate keeping" function under Daubert and its
progeny is set forth in the case of Clausen v. M/V New Carissa,
F.3d, 2003 WL 22208783, 9th Cir.(Or.), Sep 25, 2003. That court
stated:
"Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of
scientific evidence in federal district court. In Daubert
[v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)], the
Supreme Court charged district courts with the
responsibility of ensuring that proferred scientific
evidence is both relevant and reliable. See509 U.S. at
589-95. Scientific evidence is deemed reliable if the
principles and methodology used by an expert are grounded in
the methods of science. Id. at 592-95; Domingo v. T.K.,
289 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir.2002). In Daubert the Supreme
Court set forth a non-exclusive list of factors to determine
whether scientific testimony is sufficiently reliable: (1)
whether the scientific theory or technique can be [and has
been] tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether there
is a known or potential error rate; and (4) whether the
theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific
community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95. [emphasis added]
"In determining whether a proffer of scientific evidence is
sufficiently reliable, we have previously held that '[o]ne
very significant fact to be considered is whether the
experts are proposing to testify about matters growing
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted
independent of the litigation, or whether they have
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of
testifying.' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1317 (9th Cir.1995)('Daubert II'). If the testimony
is not based on independent research then what is required
is 'proof that the research and analysis supporting the
proffered conclusions have been subjected to normal
scientific scrutiny through peer review and publication.'
Id. at 1318.
"We note at the outset that neither of Daubert II's two
primary criteria for establishing the reliability of expert
testimony is met in this case. Dr. Elston's research was not
'conducted independent of the litigation.' Id. at 1317.
Rather, his opinion was developed 'expressly for purposes of
testifying.' Id. Nor was that research 'subjected to normal
scientific scrutiny through peer review and publication.'
Id. at 1318. This does not mean, however, that his testimony
was improperly admitted; a proffer of scientific testimony
may still be deemed reliable enough to be admitted if
neither of these two criteria is met. We recognized in
Daubert II that '[t]here may well be good reasons why a
scientific study has not been published. For example, it may
be too recent or of insufficiently broad interest.' Id. at
1318 n. 9. Where peer review and publication are absent,
'the experts must explain precisely how they went about
reaching their conclusions and point to some objective
source--a learned treatise, the policy statement of a
professional association, a published article in a reputable
scientific journal or the like--to show that they have
followed the scientific evidence method, as it is practiced
by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in their
field.' Id. at 1319. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993)"
The recent case of Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d
470 (D.N.J. 2002) also addressed these considerations. That
court stated:
"In Khumo Tire Co. v. Charmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), when
evaluating the reliability of the reasoning and methodology
employed by nonscientific or technical expert witnesses, the
Supreme Court's main objective is to 'ensure that an expert,
whether basing testimony on professional studies, a clearly
established methodology or technique, or on his own
specialized knowledge, skill or experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterize the practice of an expert in the relevant
field.' Khumo, 526 U.S. at 152.
.
.
.
"The linchpin of the Daubert/Paoli analysis is an evaluation
of the 'relevance and reliability' of the proposed expert
testimony. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-743 (3d Cir. 1994) ('Paoli
II') . The inquiry into reliability requires a court to
ensure that an expert's opinion is 'based on the "methods
and procedures of science" rather than on `subjective belief
or unsupported speculation.' Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742
(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). In other words, the court
must satisfy itself that the expert has 'good grounds' for
his or her opinion. Id. The Supreme Court, and the Third
Circuit, have identified several factors to assist the court
in determining whether a particular expert opinion is based
on valid reasoning or methodology. These factors include:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2)
whether the method has been subject to peer review; (3) the
known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's
operation; (5) whether the method is generally accepted; (6)
the relationship of the technique to methods which have been
established to be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the
expert witness testifying based on the methodology; and (8)
the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put.
Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 n. 8. These factors are intended to
serve only as 'useful guideposts, not dispositive hurdles
that a party must overcome in order to have expert testimony
admitted.' Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146,
152 (3d Cir. 1999); see also, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594
(emphasizing that the inquiry into the evidentiary
reliability of expert testimony under Rule 702 is intended
to be a 'a flexible one' and that the list of enumerated
factors is neither exclusive nor dispositive)."
In the case of Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), that court held:
"The Daubert factors may apply to the testimony of engineers
and other experts who are not scientists. The Daubert
'gatekeeping' obligation applies not only to 'scientific'
testimony, but to all expert testimony."
The court went on to find that other factors besides those four
listed in Daubert, (see, eg., the quote from Clausen supra) may
be considered by the trial judge in performing the gatekeeping
function. See 119 S.Ct. at 1175.
In the case of U.S. v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2000),
that court stated:
"[T]he law grants a district court the same broad latitude
when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in
respect to its ultimate reliability determination.; Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593, 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ('Many factors will
bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a
definitive checklist or test.'; 'The inquiry envisioned by
Rule 702 is ... a flexible one.'). Along the same lines is
the Court's reminder that 'the gatekeeping inquiry must be
tied to the facts of a particular case.' Kumho Tire, 526
U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)."
The case of Lappe v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 857 F.Supp.
222 (NDNY 1994), aff’d 101 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996) has been
criticized by nearly every court which has discussed it - eg.
(1) disagreement with this case was recognized by Stecyk v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 1998 WL 42302 (E.D.Pa. Jan 05, 1998),
affirmed 295 F.3d 408 (3rd Cir. 2002), (2) the Lappe case was
called into doubt by Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kunze, 996 S.W.2d
416 (Tex. 1999), rehearing overruled (1999), petition for review
denied ( 2000), rehearing of petition for review denied (2001)
and (3) the Lappe case was distinguished by Thomas v. West Bend
Co., 760 A.2d 1174 (Pa. 2000). A fourth case which apparently
has discussed the Lappe case is Ulico Casualty Company v. Clover
Capital Management, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-773 (N.D.N.Y. 09/06/2002).
That court stated:
"In assessing reliability, the court must decide
whether the expert's testimony has a 'traceable,
analytical basis in objective fact.’ Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 653, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 141 L. Ed.2d 540
(1998). 'Opinion evidence that is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert’ should not
be admitted. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 157, 119 S. Ct.
1167." [Emphasis added]
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